P
olitical redistricting was one of the first-perhaps the first-widely reported use of geographic information systems. The idea of being able to create tailor-made districts immediately captured the fancy of people of every political stripe. But whether they have resulted from the desire of incumbents to be reelected and of challengers to oust them or from the desire to meet legal challenges, as in the case of race, the fruits of the systems have seemed to many-journalists, pundits, and at least some of the public-as evidence of some deep trouble.
A simple way to put this unease is this: Geographic information systems have been used to gerrymander districts and have resulted in districts that are not somehow real. Here, for many, the concern has seemed to be with the improper use of the systems, which under better conditions might indeed produce "correctly" designed districts. And the question, with respect to geographic information systems and redistricting has been, "How can we do it right?" But I would suggest that that is simply the wrong question. It is the wrong question because it assumes that the use of geographic information systems in redistricting can be separated from the use of geographic information systems in other political and nonpolitical realms and because it assumes that a world with geographic information systems will, in the end, be very much like a world without them. I suggest that both assumptions are wrong. In what follows, I shall try to make it more clear why I believe this to be the case.
information-attributes, and so on-with locations on the surface of the Earth, where those locations are defined or definable in terms of some public system, such as latitude and longitude. This definition includes some systems that traditional users of geographic information systems would exclude and excludes other systems that use geographic information system software, as in brain mapping. Nonetheless, it has the advantage of taking in much of the activity relevant to the questions at hand. Now, a critical thing to see here is that in this definition the systems are involved with the collection, analysis, and representation of data "in space," where that space is taken to be the medium within which things exist and occur. Here, movement is viewed as a change in locational attributes over time, just as stasis is a matter of the failure of those attributes to change. This is not to say that space here must be conceptualized as an absolute, in the kind of Newtonian/container view that so many people lately have been quick to criticize; anyone familiar with practices as different as rubber sheeting and the creation of cartograms knows that to say that geographic information systems cannot appeal to a nonabsolutist, relational conception of space is simply wrong (Curry, 1997) .
Nonetheless, the definition of space that I have suggested as central to the use of geographic information systems, one in which space is a kind of metric, is strongly constricted, and in a way that has a fundamental impact on the possibilities for the representation of human actions. Let me give an example.
We have all seen or even been in a situation like the following: I am at a friend's house, cleaning up after a party. I put a dish away, and he says, "That doesn't go there." I'm at a party, where everyone is polite and sedate, and someone gets drunk and starts being belligerent. My reaction: "What's he doing here; he doesn't belong here." I grade a student's paper and note on it, "This sentence seems out of place." A family with several young children moves into a retirement community. The response: "Children don't belong here." I could continue, with examples referring to women, African Americans, Jews, and so on.
But the point is this, that in each case the example contains a reference to something or someone not belonging in some place. And I would suggest that it is this relationship of belonging that cannot be well represented within a geographic information system. Moreover, I would argue that that very relationship, which we find theoretically elaborated with such detail as far back as Aristotle's Physics and The Art of Rhetoric, is an absolutely essential one, and one that is not itself derivative of some other (Aristotle, 1961 (Aristotle, , 1991 .
In Aristotle, we see the articulation of a view wherein the natural location of objects is a matter of their location; objects stay where they belong. And extrapolating, people and events, too, have their natural places. This, of course, is the view that Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) developed in his After Virtue, a view wherein moral and legal rules can only make sense within certain contexts, within certain places. There, outside of sets of established institutions and practices, those rules simply do not offer enough for their own application. And as a result, neither moral nor political action is possible.
Indeed, on one side of the redistricting debate, where the argument is that a district ought to consist of a coherent community, there is at least tacit acknowledgment of this view (Forest, 1995 (Forest, , 1996 . Yet, one thing that makes it difficult to see this is the very discourse about redistricting. I have in mind here the criticism of, for example, North Carolina's infamous bug-splat district. In fact, much of the most visible criticism of redistricting plans developed using geographic information systems has focused on issues such as whether a district fits in with its neighbors, whether its shape is coherent and compact, and whether it "belongs." In each case, part of what is being argued is a matter of what "fits" where on a map. And I would argue that this attention to what fits on the map diverts attention from the more basic concern about the extent to which people and the actions that they undertake can in some way be seen Curry / DEMOCRACY IN A GEOCODED WORLD 11 themselves as fitting together. The issue of belonging having been transferred to the map, there is a sense in which the region or neighborhood itself is seen simply as a container within which people can be said to exist.
To say this is not, however, to suggest that we ought to abandon the geographical, or abandon the map. It is rather to point to something that geographers have long known and that is that people's attachment to places-to neighborhoods and states and regions-is established in complex ways. It is of course a matter of common knowledge that geographical features, like rivers and mountains and freeways, provide what can sometimes be taken to be "natural" boundaries of regions. Furthermore, people develop attachments based on shared symbols and stories. But beyond that, among the most studied of means for the development of attachments to place has been the development of patterned and routinized behavior, the journey to work, to church, to school, and to the local pub. Very much as a letter carrier traces out a region through her or his daily route, so too do all of us define such regions, and we do so, for better or worse, with little attention to the map (Tuan, 1977) .
And so, it seems to me that one of the difficulties that faces conventional approaches to using geographic information systems as tools in redistricting is that they embody a particular conception of space and assume the relevance of that conception, when in fact what is far more important to people in their everyday-and political-lives is place. It is not, in the end, that one cannot usefully use cartographic techniques to describe people's attachments to places, but it is surely the case that it is not done.
LIVING IN A GEOCODED WORLD
I suggested at the outset that to take an ameliorative approach to the questions raised as we apply geographic information systems to political redistricting is to fail to address deeper political problems. And that is because the relation between geographic information systems and politics is not exhausted by the topic of redistricting. Indeed, the systems have widespread uses-in the polling and fund-raising and direct marketing of candidates. So, and more broadly, I would argue that one needs to see the widespread and increasing use of geocoded data as associated with a substantial change in the nature of the cultural, and political, landscape.
In part, the difficulties arise because of the issue that I just mentioned. That is, there is a tendency when one uses a geographic information system to believe that one has established something important, when one has simply located a series of objects and attributes, while in fact, one needs as well to be able to situate those objects and attributes within a broader framework. One needs to be able to judge the nature and strength of interrelations among those objects and attributes and to understand each within the context of the other. This was a lesson hard won in anthropology, through works of people like Boas (1989) and Malinowski (1931) .
So one problem with many conventional uses of geographic information systems to analyze and represent the human landscape derives from their appeal to what amounts to an inadequate culture theory. But there is a second problem. And this problem derives from the ways in which geocoded data have come to be used. Over the past 15 years, a new industry has sprung up, called geodemographics. Based on the amalgamation of computerized files of geographical features with census and other data, these systems have come to be widely used in direct marketing, site location, and, of course, redistricting (Curry, 1997; Goss, 1994 Goss, , 1995 . Indeed, we now live in a world in which for each actual person there exists a large number of virtual people, profiles that are more or less like us but that are in fact constructs 12 SOCIAL SCIENCE COMPUTER REVIEW created through the concatenation of facts about us as individuals but also as residents of households, blocks, census tracts, ZIP codes, and the like (Agre, 1994; Clarke, 1994) .
The point here is this: Just as for the past 150 years we have seen the increasing movement of actual individuals, today we see the increasing movement of these virtual individuals who now occupy a wide range of places as our proxies. We know that this is true in politics with a vengeance, where our current president appears to live in a world occupied only by such individuals.
But just as the appeal to cartographic and other analytic techniques often involves a failure to understand the nature of attachment to places, the development of these profiles often involves a failure to attend to the different ways in which-in real life-actions and beliefs are interconnected. There are things that people say, and things that they do, and things that they say they want to do, and things they say are important, and so on. The relationships among them are not always transparent.
If in a society less urban, less mobile, and smaller in scale it was possible to read one's neighbors, to determine what they were likely to do and when, in our society this is in at least one important sense less and less possible: People are too transient, and we see them for too little of the day to be able to confidently judge them.
And if by the invention of virtual personas we hope to be able better to predict their actions and beliefs, there is another side to the story; just to the extent that these personas are established in terms of limited sets of categories and stereotypes, they render the choices that people are able to make that much more limited.
THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE
I would like to make a final point here, one that addresses the interconnection between these two issues, of people's attachment to places and of the increasing appeal to inferred data about individuals and groups. This point concerns the nature of the public and the private and the interconnection between the two.
Over the past 100 years, the right to privacy, codified by Warren and Brandeis (1890) in their famous law-review article, has existed in part as a kind of antidote to increasing urbanization. In a Simmelian society, and one in which traditional forms of civility seemed to be of diminished capacity, the formalization of the right to privacy provided a means by which the individual could carve out a niche, a place wherein he or she might test out, among other things, alternative political views (Simmel, 1903 (Simmel, /1971 . Indeed, it seems fair to say that the right to privacy and its corollaries, like the right to assembly, form the incubator within which political change can be nurtured.
Today, I would argue, the right to privacy is undergoing a change very much like the one that it underwent 100 years ago, the one that Warren and Brandeis captured. The change is this: In the past, people were concerned to be able to maintain a private place within which to speak, read, write, and act. But when it came to issues of information, the primary concern was that incorrect information not be spread about them. But today, where the control over private places has been decimated by the combination of technological change and a radical Supreme Court, and where at the same time we find a proliferation of virtual selves, the right to privacy is being rethought as a right to control those statistical concatenations of accurate information, where in sum the information tells more about us than we would like to be known or where it tells something about someone a bit like us, but a bit off.
In effect, then, the availability of these data has led to a society in which views are imputed to people who may not believe them, while politicians act as though people have those views Curry / DEMOCRACY IN A GEOCODED WORLD 13 without having any good reason to believe that people actually hold them. The result, at least at scales larger than the local, is a dissolution of the underpinnings of the political.
CONCLUSION
Now to conclude. The idea of constructing a legislature out of districts, where each district had a single representative, seems to have assumed that to some degree the representative really represented the district. As we know, this might have meant a number of things. But one thing is clear. Notwithstanding the Enlightenment origins of the United States and notwithstanding the involvement of people like Jefferson in the creation of a survey system based on very different principles, the country was created at a time and in a way where that creation could be seen as a matter of the creation of a place or set of places. From the original surveying, involving walking a path, to the creation of signs, symbols, institutions, and myths, the creation of the country was less a filling in of existing containers than a creation of those containers through this range of acts.
The more recent requirements of equal representation, though, emerge from a very different and decidedly modern way of thinking about space, where one imagines each district as a container, a vessel full of potential voters.
This change in conception of space has been accompanied by a change in conception of the individual. If 200 years ago it made sense to talk of individuals in terms of place, religion, and trade, where each was in some ways interconnected with the others, today it is more conventional to imagine that an individual's identity is more a bundle of attributes, of race and ethnicity, gender and income, and especially patterns of consumption.
This reconceptualization of space and individual has of course paralleled the rise of modern science and technology, and particularly the technologies of control associated with the modern computer (Beniger, 1986) . And it is this association that should tell us that we cannot see the technologies simply as neutral reporters. Rather, we need to see them as active agents in these changes.
But this ought not to be seen as somehow implying that because those conceptions of space and individual have changed with the new technologies, those technologies are well equipped to make sense of the changes. Rather, just because the one has been so tightly imbricated with the other, we need, in addressing the question of redistricting, to ask ourselves about the role of the technologies themselves in political life. I have suggested that there is good reason to believe that the technologies of the geographic information system family have in fact been associated with a recasting of both the public and the private in ways that render the political much less viable. This is not to say that the technologies could not be otherwise used. It is, though, to say that such uses will certainly run against the grain.
